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CIA OFFICE OF SECURITY  
PERSONNEL SECURITY  
CALENDAR YEAR STATISTICS  
TAKEN FROM OPERATIONAL RECORDS

PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION

		<u>Calendar Years</u>			
		<u>1953</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1956</u>
Persons Cleared					
Applicants . . . . .					
25X9A2 Outside Contacts . . . . .					
Classified Contracts . . . . .					
Totals					
Applicants Rejected for Security Reasons . . . . .					
Relative Percentage of Overt Applicants Disapproved to total Cases Completely Processed . . . . .					
Average Number of Days Required for Full Clearance					
Field . . . . .					
Office . . . . .					
Total					

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**PERSONNEL SECURITY STATISTICS (Continued)**

Overt Cases in  
Process as of

31 Dec 1953

31 Dec 1954

31 Dec 1955

31 Dec 1956

Applicants . . . . .

Intelligence Contacts . . . . .

Contract and others . . . . .

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CIA OFFICE OF SECURITY

STATISTICS ON HEADQUARTERS INTERVIEWS  
BY CALENDAR YEARS FROM  
RECORDS OF INTERROGATION RESEARCH DIVISION (Continued)

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1956</u>
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RD TDY Trips . . . . .	4	16	6	23

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\* May 1956 saw the first pre-employment cases conducted by IRD. These cases are conducted without the benefit of field investigations. The figures quoted above indicate that polygraph caused 18.2% of the cases  to be cancelled because of derogatory information. When field investigations were present in the file as in most of the other types of cases, polygraph caused a total of from 2.4% to 3.8% case cancellations.

\*\* Included in Total on Preceding Page

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**CIA OFFICE OF SECURITY**

**FISCAL YEARS 1953-56**

**PHYSICAL SECURITY DIVISION (Continued)**

	<u>FY 1953</u>	<u>FY 1954</u>	<u>FY 1955</u>	<u>FY 1956</u>
Security problems handled by Night Security Officers.	4,914	5,622	9,079	11,918
Security lectures and briefings . . . . .	99	57	57	20
Classified waste destroyed (thousands lbs) . . . . .	988	1,410	1,587	1,733
Safety surveys & inspections . . . . .	138	141	129	119
CIA Building Guards . . . . .				
** Foreign inspections . . . . .				

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\*\* Function acquired from OS Inspection Staff 1 February 1956

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### SECURITY SUPPORT DIVISION

The years 1953-56 developed new responsibilities and additional work requirements for the Security Support Division. Highlights of the period were revisions in operational procedures and organization.

#### PROCEDURES AND ADMINISTRATION

The SSD Agents Manual, published in November 1953, and the SSD Headquarters Manual, published in April 1954, represented major administrative advances, in that for the first time, procedures utilized throughout the Division were codified and defined.

In December 1954, a major reorganization was effected. The Special Security Division was redesignated the Security Support Division and placed under the direction of the Deputy Director of Security for Investigations and Operational Support. Previously, all investigations at the working level were supervised by a single branch. To handle the expanded activities, three branches were created: the Investigations Branch, responsible for investigations and clearances; the Support Branch, responsible for providing operational and cover support; and the Correspondents and Records Branch, responsible for the administration of the covert files and the Confidential Correspondents (contract investigators).

In October 1956, the Investigations Branch adopted the concept of geographical, rather than functional, responsibility. The various desks were

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realigned geographically to serve the area divisions of DDP and other Agency components.

During the 1953-56 period, adjustments were made in the territorial jurisdictions [ ] and a comprehensive study of the Resident Agencies was conducted in order to provide more efficient coverage of those areas with increased workloads.

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[ ] implemented in the early part of 1955, defined the responsibilities of the Operating components and of the Office of Security regarding covert clearances and refined the mechanics of the clearance procedure, creating an overall increase in general efficiency.

During this period, emphasis on the screening, procurement and utilization of Confidential Correspondents (contract investigators) was stepped up to the point where their number and effectiveness were such that they could provide temporary additional investigative strength during heavy workload periods without necessitating any increase in T/O.

#### OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

Requests by all components of the Agency for operational support increased tremendously during the 1953-56 period.

✓ In May 1954, the Support Branch of SSD assumed overall responsibility for the operation of [ ]

[ ]

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In 1954, the Security Support Division was called upon to provide security planning and personnel for a highly sensitive project, then known as AQUATONE. This function included the recruitment and training in security techniques of a large number of personnel, in addition to the processing of an extremely high volume of clearance requests and miscellaneous support requirements.


Also in 1954, the Security Office devoted a large proportion of its time and assets to a highly sensitive Agency project, PBSUCCESS. This included the provision of escort agents for the air movement of sensitive materials and other investigative and support functions.

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The Cover Support Desk of the Support Branch, which evolved during the 1953-56 period, began as a pioneer effort to provide support to the overall cover plans for personnel and activities of the Agency. It now furnishes support in the cover field to Central Cover Division and other components of the Agency through utilization of SSD investigative and support facilities.

The following statistics show covert cases in process as of:

31 December 1953 -  
31 December 1954 -  
31 December 1955 -  
31 December 1956 -



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**PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION**

**ACTIONS IN 1953-1956 RELATIVE TO RECOMMENDATIONS  
OF THE CLARK TASK FORCE REGARDING PERIODIC  
REINVESTIGATIONS OF THE SECURITY OF EMPLOYEES**

The Clark Task Force recommended in June 1955 that measures be initiated for rechecking the security status of all personnel engaged in Intelligence at periodic intervals not to exceed five years in any individual case.

The problem of reinvestigating employees has been under constant consideration since 1952. In August 1952 it was estimated that at the capability of the Personnel Security Division at that time, it would have taken six years to complete the backlog of cases needing partial or full reinvestigation. Throughout the years under consideration, the workload of the Division in processing current requests had kept the Division's capabilities taxed to the fullest.

Procedures long in effect at the time of the Clark Task Force recommendation, caused employees' files to be reviewed on reassignment, on receipt of special clearances, in case of marriage, or upon receipt of allegations impugning the security of the employee. When necessary in these cases the following actions are taken:

- (a) Name checks of Agency files or of the files of other Government agencies;

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- (b) Additional polygraph or interviews with the employee;
- (c) Full field investigations by this Agency; or
- (d) Investigations by FBI under one of the Executive Orders concerning loyalty or security or under the Atomic Energy Act or Mutual Security Act if an employee is to receive a "Q" clearance

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Set out below are statistics covering the number of random reinvestigation actions taken in CALENDAR YEARS from 1953 to 1956:

	Routine Reinvestigation	Special Reinvestigation Including EO 10450 Cases	FBI Investigations Under the Atomic Energy Act*
1953			48
1954			47
1955	153	316	80
1956	181	238	114

**ACTIONS BY THE AGENCY TO CONFORM TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450 (AND AMENDMENTS) DURING THE PERIOD 1953-1956**

On 27 April 1953, Executive Order 10450 was issued establishing a security program for Federal departments and agencies. Under this Executive Order, all cases adjudicated under Executive Order 9835, which established a Loyalty of Government Employees program were readjudicated to determine whether they met the requirements of the new order. On 3 June

\*Figures are not available for FBI investigations of Agency employees under the Mutual Security Act.

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the Office of General Counsel advised that it was prepared to rule that a review by the Office of Security of cases processed under Executive Order 9835 would constitute the readjudication required by Executive Order 10450. On 4 June this review was effected and each applicable file was documented to show that it had been readjudicated. This covered some 47 cases. Of these, eight cases which were initiated under Executive Order 9835 and pending at the time EO 10450 was issued, were adjudicated in accordance with the standards established by the new order.

Set out below is the number of cases processed under Executive Order 10450 for the fiscal years 1954, 1955, 1956, and 1957:

<u>Number of Cases</u>	<u>FY 1954</u>	<u>FY 1955</u>	<u>FY 1956</u>	<u>FY 1957</u>
With Board	9	2	10	8
Without Board	<u>11</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>21</u>
Total	20*	12	22	29

#### FORMATION OF MEDICAL, PERSONNEL, SECURITY PANEL ✓

In July 1953 an important step was taken at the direction of the Deputy Director, Support in the processing of applicants for Agency employment. The Personnel Director, the Chief Medical Staff and the Director of Security were directed to pool and coordinate marginal administrative information which each may develop in processing the case of any applicant for

\*This includes eight cases in process at the time EO 10450 was issued.

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employment which by itself would be insufficient to result in a rejection under the employment standards for which each office had specific responsibility. By marginal administrative information was meant that which would raise a question as to the applicant's harmonious assimilation into the daily working life of the Agency. This data may express itself in terms of basic selfishness, unpleasing habits, or handicaps which of themselves would be insufficient reasons on which to base a medical, personnel or security rejection. However, after coordinating and pooling the data available to all offices, sufficient reason may be found to consider the applicant unfit for an Agency position.

Under the procedures followed, a meeting has been held once a week constituting a Panel of officials designated by the Medical Staff, Office of Security and Personnel Office to fully discuss as much information as possible in the possession of each office, as would be consistent with professional medical and security operating standards. Under the chairmanship of the Personnel Office representative, all information furnished has been weighed and recommendations made to the Personnel Office to hire or to reject the applicant. In cases of rejection of an application, the Personnel Office notifies the Agency component requesting the applicant of the rejection. The requesting component may appeal any rejected application to the Deputy Director, Support and if necessary the appeal may be directed to the Inspector General.

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
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**INTERROGATION RESEARCH DIVISION**

A study of the statistics will show that there was a steady increase in the quality and an apparent improvement in the technique of  polygraph interview cases. In 1953, 409 reports were written; in 1956, 1,728 reports were written. In 1953, 8.9% of the interviews resulted in reports, and in 1956, 41.6% resulted in reports.



In 1953, the responsibility and authority for training polygraph examiners was given to IRD. This resulted in the permanent establishment of a position of Research and Training Officer. This position was responsible for the training of approximately  individuals during this period.

Security questions to be presented during interviews were completely revised as well as the policy to afford the appropriate type of testing.

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During this period, polygraph became an intricate part of the employee security screening program, thus becoming a routine requirement of the screening process. Several loyalty board cases were submitted as a direct result of polygraph.

Research resulted in the following developments or plans:

- (a) A portable instrument was built specifically at the order of and to the specifications of IRD. The instrument is most efficient and even today is the most widely used device.
- (b) The hand electrode, widely used in the field of lie detection today, was developed and first built by IRD technicians.
- (c) During 1953-1956, plans were laid for eventual miniaturization and electronification of the instrument.
- (d) Other physiological phenomena were studied for possibility of incorporation in the instrument as additional indices of deception, such as skin radiation.

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**SECRET****PHYSICAL SECURITY DIVISION****ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE**

In 1953, the physical security activities of the Office of Security were being carried out by the Physical Security Branch of the Security Division. At that time, the Physical Security Branch was composed of three sections: the Building Security Section; the Investigative Section; and a Technical Section. Within the Building Security Section was placed the responsibility for the direct supervision of the Night Security Officers and the Receptionists, as well as the responsibility for badging of personnel and the safe maintenance and Combination Change Program. The Section also exercised general supervision over the GSA Guards assigned to CIA Headquarters buildings. A Classified Waste Officer was also assigned to this Section in order to provide supervision over the collection and destruction of all classified waste collected from CIA Headquarters buildings.

Within the Investigative Section was placed responsibility for the Security Violation Program, physical security surveys in the Headquarters area, and the conduct of miscellaneous investigations. The Technical Section concerned itself with making security determinations on request for inter-communication systems, requests for alarms and to research effort on special locks and safekeeping equipment. Operating out of the Office of the Branch Chief were two safety engineers, responsible for giving advice and guidance on all safety matters, as well as the Firearms Control Officer.

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25X1 In November of 1955, the Physical Security Division was activated, following to a large extent the organizational structure of the Physical Security Branch. The Physical Security Branch became a Branch of the newly activated Physical Security Division and retained the responsibilities formerly assigned to the Investigation Section. However, responsibility for the conduct of physical security surveys had expanded from the immediate Headquarters area to include the entire United States; and by 1956 the total number of installations within the United States under security responsibility was  With the reorganization of the Office of Security Inspection Staff in January of 1956, this Physical Security Branch took over the additional duties of conducting overseas physical security surveys, as well as rendering physical security support and guidance to overseas installations.

The Technical Section became the Technical Branch with a personnel complement of audio support specialists; and the Building Security Section became the Building Security Branch, retaining the responsibilities formerly assigned to the Section. A Safety Office was established on a Staff level to the Office of the Division Chief. Subsequently the Physical Security Branch of the Physical Security Division was renamed the Survey Branch; and it is under this organizational structure that the Physical Security Division presently functions.

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### RESEARCH IN PHYSICAL SECURITY EQUIPMENT

During the period 1953 to 1956, the Physical Security Division was most active in conducting research on equipment needed in the physical security field. Such research was conducted both by the Division itself, as well as in conjunction with the Bureau of Standards. In conjunction with the Bureau of Standards, various tests were conducted on the use of alarm systems; and as a result of such tests, recommendations were made to the manufacturers as to the methods of coping with the then inadequacy of alarm systems.

The Physical Security Division became most interested in the study of alarm systems because of the increase in restricted and secure areas for "special projects" that was taking place during this period. Alarm systems, such as the ultrasonic and capacitance types, were checked out and then installed on a temporary basis during the critical times of the projects. Based upon experience with these alarm systems, further recommendations were made that alarms be included, in certain cases, as a requirement for secure areas, both within the Agency, and to some extent in industrial security requirements.

Studies were also made during this period by the Physical Security Division of the various combination locks used on safekeeping equipment in the Agency. As a result of these studies, the, at that time, only approved Group I lock, the Sergeant and Greenleaf (three-way combination lock) was

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shown to have definite weaknesses, which through study and experimentation were overcome by recommendation of certain changes to the Company. As a result of these changes, the "R" and a later "T" series model of the Sergeant and Greenleaf lock were put into production. These latter series locks represent the greater proportion of the locks presently in use in the Agency today.

In 1956 a more formal mechanism was established by the Government to look into the field of security equipment, namely the Federal Committee on Security Equipment. This Committee was to be chaired by the General Services Administration with representatives from the State Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau of Standards. The functions of this Committee were to review all security equipment in use in the Government, to include safes, locks, padlocks, and alarm systems. The Committee was to draw up interim specifications, which were to be used as the basis of bids by independent safe and lock manufacturers. The Bureau of Standards was to test the submitted equipment and, depending upon the results of such tests, specifications for approved safekeeping equipment and secure locks were to be determined.

The CIA representative to the Committee was nominated from the Physical Security Division. By virtue of such membership on the Committee, it has been possible for the Physical Security Division up to the present time

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to draw upon the combined resources of all the members of the Committee in keeping abreast of the latest developments in the security equipment field.

On occasion, security tests were made by the Physical Security Division to determine the strength and weaknesses of new type safe chests and cabinets submitted to this Agency for its possible use independent of GSA specification, primarily not marketable items for the commercial market, but items peculiar to our particular requirements. One such example is the Remington-Rand safe as opposed to a safe filing cabinet, which is suitable for use in a home, but which had extra built in security requirements, such as additional protection of the lock, special hard plate protection for bolts and was adaptable to being secured to the floor of a residence.

#### BADGING

In 1953 a rebadging of all Agency personnel was accomplished. A study of many badge systems was made, among which were ones of various type materials. The final selection was made of a three-part laminated badge, which was fused into a single badge which included a picture, identification number and coded physical description. The fusing of this three-part badge prevented any unauthorized person from separating the badge and inserting another picture.

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### **FIREARMS**

The original regulations spelled out the issuance of an Agency Firearms Credential for the use of couriers and the protection of classified defense information. The regulation was rewritten again in August of 1955 spelling out the use of the Agency Firearms Credential under Section 6D, Public Law 110, but incorporated in the new regulation was the establishment of the CIA Firearms Control Officer as the authorized authority for the issuance of any weapons for other than research and evaluation in the zone of the interior. Also the Firearms Officer was responsible for the training and qualifying of all Agency personnel in the overt use of firearms, certification of such qualification, as well as the issuance of the Firearms Credential.

### **SAFETY**

During the period 1953 to 1956, the Safety Office initiated numerous safety programs throughout the Agency. One such safety program consisted of testing throughout the Agency for toxic fumes, flammable and explosive vapors, electrical defects, proper lighting and air velocity. Numerous instances were found in reproduction shops, machine shops, etc., where petroleum vapors showed on the lower explosive level. Also many instances were discovered in warehouses, communication training shops, and motor generator houses where carbon monoxide fumes were higher than the allowable limit for the safety and health of the employees working in these establishments.

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Numerous tests were also conducted by the Safety Office to determine whether or not lighting in hallways, corridors, parking lots, etc., met the accepted standards. Numerous conduits and machines carrying voltage sufficient to kill, were discovered as a result of these tests.

In 1953 the Safety Office initiated a program to provide guidance throughout the Agency for major remodeling, construction, floor loading and reinforcement of existing floors. Requests along these lines have numbered approximately 35 per month ever since the initiation of this program.

In 1954 a Safety Poster Program was initiated in order to bring more forcefully to the attention of all Agency personnel the every day hazards in working conditions.

A training program was initiated in the middle part of 1955, whereby over 120 Agency personnel associated with building emergency plans (for fire or civil defense) were trained in the use of fire fighting equipment. This training included both lectures and demonstrations on all types of fire fighting equipment, from fire extinguishers to the proper handling of 2 1/2 inch pressure hoses. Also in 1955 an Accident Statistic Program was established which provided the Agency with severity and frequency rates, thereby allowing the Agency a basis of comparison with

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other Governmental agencies, as well as the National Safety Council's rates for private industry.

The year 1956 saw the establishment of a procedure between the Office of Logistics and the Safety Office, Physical Security Division, whereby all shipments of ordnance must be approved by Safety Office representatives prior to shipment.

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### **SECURITY RESEARCH STAFF**

The Security Research Staff was organized in 1951 headed by a chief and one assistant. By 1953 the Staff consisted of the chief and three other professionals and two stenographic personnel. By 1956 the table of organization consisted of eleven professionals and six stenographic personnel.

During the period 1953 to 1956 the Security Research Staff handled innumerable allegations and reports relative to the loyalty or security of Agency personnel and applicants and, in addition, several cases and allegations were resolved involving false allegations and attempts at smears and black propaganda against Agency personnel by disgruntled emigre groups and the like; also numerous cases were handled by the Staff involving suitability for continued employment of Agency personnel including many individuals returned from overseas for cause. During this period, the Staff was involved in a coordinated effort with the FBI in a major espionage case. Some 500 pieces of correspondence have since been sent to the FBI on this matter and approximately 400 interviews have been conducted by this Staff in the United States and several countries overseas in determining the effects of the case on Agency personnel and operations. It has been determined that damage has occurred to the Agency as a result of that case. The espionage apparatus involved had three agents in OSS, two of whom were identified and one unidentified. In 1956 after receiving the characteristics of the unidentified agent in OSS, this Staff was able to identify him.

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During the 1953-1956 period this Staff noted and followed closely a rapidly stepped up effort by the Soviet Intelligence Service to penetrate this Agency through blackmail and cultivation efforts and took the necessary steps to prevent those attempts from being successful.

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**SECRET****ADMINISTRATION & TRAINING STAFF****1. PERSONNEL BRANCH****1953**

During 1953, membership in Group Hospitalization was opened to all Office of Security employees. Prior to this, membership was open to only those employees on vouchered funds.

A survey was conducted in the Branch concerning personnel with a Career Service designation in the Office of Security. The survey included pertinent information on all Office of Security personnel assigned to the Office as well as other components within the Agency.

An analysis of the overtime records of receptionists resulted in a saving of \$7022.00 per annum when it was concluded that sixteen receptionists posts could be eliminated insofar as Saturday needs were concerned.

A classification survey of the Administration and Training Staff by the Office of Personnel was conducted and resulted in the establishment within the Staff of three Branches - Administration & Support Branch; Personnel Branch and Training Branch.

**1954**

At the request of the Wage & Classification Division, new personnel actions were prepared on all Office of Security personnel in order to standardize the job numbering system of the Agency.

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At a critical point during 1954 when it was necessary to hire 136 employees, the Personnel Branch, in order to accomplish this task, interviewed 800 persons and reviewed 1800 files of prospective applicants.

The Office of Security authorized ceiling of [ ] was increased to the 25X9A2

25X9A2 T/O strength of [ ] In this regard, recruitment was accelerated and coordination was closely effected with the Placement and Utilization Division of the Office of Personnel. The result of this increase in strength was the hiring of a number of Civil Service Commission investigators, and accounts for the increase in on-board strength from [ ] in 25X9A2 June 1955.

### 1955

The establishment of the Summer Employee Program helped bridge the gap created by vacation schedules of the regular clerical employees of the Office of Security.

A program was devised during 1955 in which all clerical employees who had resigned during the year previous were contacted relative to part-time employment. This program also provided for a canvassing of wives and husbands of Office of Security employees relative to availability for part-time employment.

May 1955 saw the beginning of the recruitment program for Project AQUATONE.

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A Foreign Section, which evolved into what is now known as the Foreign Support Staff, was established. The general responsibility of the Section was a focalization of all matters pertaining to the overseas activities of Office of Security employees and included the processing of all communications between Headquarters and overseas stations pertaining to all matters affecting the Office of Security, either administratively or from the standpoint of Operational Support.

### 1956

During 1956, Career sheets were completed on most of the personnel assigned to the Office of Security. These forms included information concerning qualifications, background, skills, and area assignment preferences. These forms improved greatly the position of the Office insofar as training and assignments were concerned.

With the establishment of a Career Management Program, a Career Management Officer was assigned to the Administration and Training Staff on 19 September 1956.

## 2. TRAINING BRANCH

The security indoctrination responsibility for the Office of Security passed from the Physical Security Division to the Training Branch, Administration and Training Staff, on 1 March 1955. Attendance records for all programs prior to that date are no longer available. Records subsequent to that date have been kept and show the following on a calendar year basis:

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	<u>Number of Lectures</u>	<u>Number of People</u>
1 March 1955 - 31 December 1955	41	2076
1 January 1956 - 31 December 1956	46	2382

### 3. ADMINISTRATION & SUPPORT BRANCH

In 1956 an annual audit  was conducted by this Branch. Obligations of the Office of Security for the fiscal years involved were as follows:

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1953  
1954  
1955  
1956



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Increases in the obligations were brought about by increases in:

Personal Services --Due to higher employment and pay raises.

Travel--Due to increase in escort duties and volume of investigations.

Guard Coverage--Due to expanded coverage and pay increases.

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## SECURITY STAFF, OFFICE OF LOGISTICS

### ORGANIZATION

The Security Staff of the Office of Logistics was established as a part of the Administrative Staff/OL at the time the present organization of the Office of Logistics was approved, in March 1953. The Security Officer reported directly to the Chief of Logistics on all matters of a security nature requiring his attention.

In early 1954 the security functions, including contract security, were removed from the Administrative Staff of the Office of Logistics and established as a separate staff function reporting directly to the Chief of Logistics. The creation of a separate Security Staff was an organizational change which has proved most successful in actual practice.

### POLICY

On 7 May 1954 CIA Regulation [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was rescinded and superseded by Regulation [REDACTED] bearing the same title. This new regulation defined the policy and responsibilities for the administration of the Industrial Security Program and specified the procedures by which the program is implemented by the Security Staff, Office of Logistics.

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**Industrial Security Program**

Beginning in April 1956 the Industrial Security Program of the Office of Logistics was reorganized to provide for systematic reinspections and rebriefings of industrial facilities engaged in classified procurement with the Agency. Records and controls were instituted to provide for recovery of classified documents and material upon completion of classified contracts. Arrangements were also made by the Security Officers of TSS/DD/P to assist in the program and for additional assistance to be provided by the Office of Security on a temporary basis.



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Security surveys were made in 1952 by the Security Officer of the Office of Logistics, with personnel of the Office of Security and the Office



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nation was made by the Office of Logistics to abandon the use of these warehouses in favor of a single location

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Security support and guidance were given in the establishment of warehousing

25X1A6A facilities

The Security Officer of Logistics conducted an initial security inspection of the facility and receiving and storing operations were begun at that facility on 1 June 1953.

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